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THE TERRITORY OF JEFFERSON
By Rodney J. Bardwell Jr. of the Denver Bar*
HE Territory of Jefferson was an illegal commonwealth,
set up by the residents of parts of the Territories of
Kansas, Utah and Nebraska. The parts of these Territories covered by the Territory of Jefferson, practically correspond with the present boundaries of the State of Colorado.
This provisional territorial government existed from the time
of the ratification of the constitution and the election of the
first governor and assembly on October 24, 1859, to approximately June 6, 1861.
In order properly to understand the problems and attempts to solve them during the existence of the Territory of
Jefferson, it is necessary to go into the history of this country
immediately preceding the formation of the Territory. The
present State of Colorado was referred to in the old histories
as the Pikes Peak Region. There had been various gold discoveries reported in the Pikes Peak Region from time to time
previous to the actual settling of Colorado. These reports,
however, were discredited and people had not made a rush
to this section as a result of them. However, in the year 1858,
a discovery of gold was made on the right bank of the Platte
River, within the present boundaries of the City and County
of Denver, by an army teamster then encamped here. He
was discharged from the service a month or two after this
discovery, and returning to the States, created some enthusiasm
through accounts of this gold discovery.
In the winter of 1858, there were very few inhabitants
in the district now comprising this state, so there was no immediate need for any organized form of government. However, the settlers realized that many people had migrated to
the west boundaries of the states adjoining this region on the
*A paper presented before the Law Club of Denver.
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east, and were preparing for a gold rush into the Pikes Peak
region in the spring of 1859. Therefore, a movement was
started to secure an organized government to provide for the
anticipated requirements. Kansas Territory embraced most
of this area, there being only small strips of land which were
included in the Territories of Nebraska and Utah. Under the
act creating Kansas Territory, the following wording was
used:
"That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the
rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in said Territory,
so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the
United States and such Indians, or to include any territory which, by treaty
with any Indian tribe, is not, without the consent of said tribe, to be included
within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any state or territory; but all
such territory shall be excepted out of the boundaries and constitute no part
of the Territory of Kansas until such tribe shall signify their assent to the
President of the United States to be included within the said Territory, or to
affect the authority of the Government of the United States to make any regulations respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights, by treaty,
law or otherwise which it would have been competent for the Government to
make if this act had never passed."

The assembly of Kansas had established Arapahoe County in 1855. This county was very large, and included quite
extensive territory in the now State of Colorado. Practically
all of the Territory of Kansas which would be included within
the present boundaries of the State of Colorado was Indian
tribal territory. There arose grave doubts as to whether the
Territory of Kansas had a right to legislate and en-force laws
within this tribal area. Also, the settled portion of this region
was far removed from that part of Kansas then settled, so that
it would be very difficult to enforce law and order if Kansas
had authority to govern this region.
The people of Arapahoe County at an election November
6, 1858, held in Auraria City, delegated A. J. Smith as their
representative to the legislative assembly of Kansas Territory.
The only recorded act that Smith put through the assembly
was to divide the county of Arapahoe into five separate counties, which only tended to complicate matters amongst the
various governments established later. At this same election
Hiram J. Graham was delegated to go to Washington to promote the political interests of the people at Pikes Peak. His
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proposals to congress, however, for the establishment of a
territory in this region were not adopted, and it was due primarily to this that the Pikes Peak residents decided to form
a government of their own, and instead of having a territorial
government, decided to have a state government. The state
contemplated embraced an area more than forty per cent
larger than the present State of Colorado, and included parts
of the now State of Nebraska, nearly one-half of Wyoming,
and a part of Utah.
In, defense of the zeal of the residents of this territory in
organizing a government of their own, and not waiting for
Congress to establish a territory, the then attitude of Congress
toward territories should be explained. This was shortly before the outbreak of the Civil War, and the members of Congress were either representing slave states or were opposed to
the ideas of slavery; therefore, whenever a new territory was
proposed, the group against slavery tried to have their views
incorporated in, the territorial act, which would immediately
provoke olposition from the slave states, and for this reason
it was next to impossible to have any new territories created,
so that it became increasingly necessary for settlers in remote
regions to establish local self government for their own protection.
The proclamation of the settlers in adopting a government of their own, is set forth in the first issue of the Rocky
Mountain News, dated April 23, 1859, which reported a convention of the 15th of April, 1859, as follows:
"Being vividly impressed by our recent journey hither over the plains,
with the great distance our heterogeneous and active population is removed
from any seat of government, either territorial or state, of the United States,
where our wants could be made known, or civil and religious rights protected,
and our wrongs redressed; having already experienced the evils of such remoteness from government adequate to the duty of trying and punishing crime;
and being fully impressed with the belief, from early and recent precedents, of
the power and benefits and duty of self-government; and of the evils attending the government of bodies of men by agents of States or Territories at a
distance, or of legislation without representation; and, ** * *
"Whereas, owing to the absolute and pressing necessity for an immediate
and adequate government for the large population now here and soon to be
among us, actively engaged in the various acts of life; and aware of the impossibility of an early formation into a territorial government, that duty having
been neglected by the recent session of Congress; and also believing that a
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territorial government is not such as our large and peculiarly situated population demands" * * * (After this follows an intention to create a state and
not a territory.)

Another reason set forth in an address to the preliminary
convention of the "intended State of Jefferson", which appears
in the issue of the News of May 7, follows:
"Again, if crime be committed, the United States Courts of a Territory
are the only ones competent for a trial, and what criminal will be deterred
from the commission of crime when his judge is separatcd from him by seven
hundred miles of arid waste? Government of some kind we must have, and
the question narrows itself down to this point: Shall it be the government
of the knife and the revolver, or shall we unite in forming here in our golden
country, among the ravines and gulches of the Rocky Mountains, and the
fertile valleys of the Arkansas and Plattes, a new and independent state?
Shall the real keystone of the Union now be set on the summit of the arch,
and a republic inaugurated that can from her mountain aerie cast her eye to
the Pacific on the one hand and the Atlantic on the other? Embracing the
waters of the Arkansas and the Plattes flowing into the Atlantic, Grand River
and the Colorado flowing to the Pacific, she at once becomes the real center
of the Union.
"We may soon expect the advent of the iron horse, and a national railroad is no longer a question. Northern and southern routes will no longer
be a cause of delay, for nature has provided by her golden largess an argument for its location that will be irresistible, and both roads will become not a
disputed issue but a remunerative speculation."

An interesting article appeared in the Rocky Mountain
News of May 14, 1859, as a warning to horse thieves. This
article was as follows:
"These gentry have been pursuing their calling with great industry
and success for a few days since. Some sixteen horses and mules have been
stolen from this vicinity in the last three days. We give the rascals warning
that if they are caught, they will be called upon to dance upon nothing, with
a very short time for preparation."

On May 9, 1859, delegates were elected to organize a
new and independent state of the Union. These met on the
6th day of June, and after appointing committees, decided that
new precincts should be formed and delegates sent to a convention to be held on the 1st day in August; these delegates
were to be apportioned according to the number of residents
of the various precincts. During the months of June and July
a considerable opposition to the movement to organize a state
arose among the people, most of the objections coming from
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those professing to favor a territorial form of government.
The convention convened in August, and it was decided that
the convention should prepare a constitution for the State of
Jefferson, and also prepare a memorial to congress, asking
an immediate organization of a territorial government for
this district; that the proposition should be put to a vote of
the people in September, as to whether a state or a territory
should be formed. It appears that on August 5, 1859, during
the convention, this state took its first steps to regulate the
saloon-keeper. Smiley's history reports as follows:
"It appears that the saloon had become a practical issue and that the

assembly had been annoyed by its 'influence' as Delegate Eli Carter moved,
in the forenoon of that day 'That the Sergeant-at-Arms be requested to desire
all liquor saloons to remove at least fifty yards from this building.' "

But the record is silent as to the disposition made of Mr.
Carter's motion, which was the first proposition advanced
upon Colorado soil to "regulate" the saloon-keeper.
At the September election, the vote was against the formation of a state and for the formation of a territory. The
leaders, having based all their plans on the supplosition that
the people would adopt a state form of government, had not
made any provisions for a government if the people adopted
a territorial form. At this election, the returns from Fountain
City, which later developed into the City of Pueblo, were
as follows: for territory, 1; for state, 1089; but as stated in
the history, the Fountain City return was either an error or
a gross misrepresentation, the truth being that the vote was
probably 89 instead of 1089.
The people of the Cherry Creek towns called a mass convention on the 24th of September, and sent out a circular letter
to the voters of Jefferson Territory requesting that the voters
of all precincts on, the first Monday in October appoint or
elect delegates in the ratio of one delegate from each 50 voters,
to meet in convention in Denver the second Monday in October to form a provisional government. The election was held
on the first Monday in October, both for delegates to the conven'tion and also for the election of a delegate to Congress
from Jefferson Territory. Beverly D. Williams was elected
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to Congress.
lows:

This election was described by Smiley as fol-

"The election was conducted recklessly, with 'terrible ballot-box stuffing' as one of the accompaniments, and 'returns' were sent in from several
alleged precincts of which no one had ever heard before. However, Beverly D.
Williams, *** emerged from the scrape with a large plurality of the honest
votes."

The delegates elected to the territorial convention assembled at Denver City October 10, 1859, and a constitution was
drawn and nominations for the various territorial offices were
made by the delegates. The constitution appointed the 4th
Monday of October as the time for holding the election for
territorial executive and judicial officers, and district elections
for members of the Assembly, subject to the ratification of the
constitution, which was to be submitted to "a vote of the
people" on that date. At this election the constitution was
adopted and the men nominated by the convention for the
territorial offices were elected over an independent ticket,
Robert W. Steele being elected governor. The election, however, did not turn out as contemplated, as no elections were
held in 5 of the 19 districts; the campaign managers consolidated the 17th and 19th districts with the 13th, and gave the
combination 3 representatives, and raised the representation
of the 5th from one to three, and that of both the 4th and
6th from one to two, and still the quota elected lacked one
of having the number provided for by the apportionment.
The executive and judicial officers of Jefferson Territory
were sworn in, and the new government machinery put in
motion. The members of the general assembly gathered in
Denver City on November 7, and Governor Steele delivered
his first annual message to the Assembly.
The assembly provided for by the constitution consisted
of two houses; there were to be 8 members in the upper
house, and 21 members in the lower house. The Assembly
divided the territory into three judicial districts, and assigned
judges thereto. The first term of these district officers was
to begin on the 3rd Monday in January, 1860. The assembly
turned out laws at a rapid rate. One of the most worth-while
acts of the assembly was the consolidation of Auraria City,
our present West Denver, with Denver City, which was the
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present down-town portion of Denver, and with Highlands,
the present North Denver, as the municipality of Denver
City. Under this act the first city officers for the Cherry Creek
towns were elected December 10, 1859, although this union
was not formally approved by the cities until the next April.
The assembly levied a poll tax of $1.00 to defray immediate expenses and appointed committees to prepare full Civil
and Criminal codes and report them to a later session to be
called by the governor.
The assembly met in special session, pursuant to a proclamation by the Governor on January 23, 1860, adopted codes
drawn by the committees, received the governor's approval
of the legislation, and the lawmakers adjourned on January 25.
A study of the Civil and Criminal codes as adopted by
the assembly of the Territory of Jefferson discloses that they
were very complete, setting forth in detail the various pleadings, defining causes of demurrer and service of notices, also
concerning replevin, executions, foreclosure of mortgages,
habeas corpus, providing for jury selections and the like, and
would, with very few changes, be comparable to our own
codes.
Several special legislative acts were passed besides the
one consolidating and incorporating the Cherry Creek towns.
These included incorporation of road, ditch, lumbering,
bridge, hydraulic, town, and insurance companies. The Jefferson constitution provided that "every white male citizen
of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years," excepting
persons "convicted of any infamous crime," shall be entitled
to a vote at all elections held according to law." But the
Jefferson "law" specifically denied the ballot to Indians, and
to "negroes, mulattoes or black persons." Sec. 378 of the
Jefferson Civil Code contains the following respecting witnesses: "Every human being of sufficient capacity to understand the obligation of an oath, is a competent witness in all
cases, both civil and criminal, except as otherwise herein declared. But an Indian, a negro, or a mulatto or black person
shall not be allowed to give testimony in any cause."
The revenue system put a special tax on every occupation
except those of farming and mining. On storekeepers, the tax
was one-fourth of one per cent. on all merchandise offered
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for sale that was "not the growth, manufacture or product
of the Territory"-a home-made protective tariff. The tax
on gamblers was $2.50 per month, "on each table or other
appliance used for gaming." There was a territorial seal
provided, and the territory was divided into 12 counties.
January 2, 1860, the voters in Mountain County, which
embraced the upper Clear Creek mining districts, instead of
voting for county officers, held an election to decide whether
or not there should be such a county. The vote was four to
one against recognition of the county, and some 650 silver
miners signed a protest against, and a refusal to pay a poll tax
of $1.00, and sent the document down to Governor Steele.
The territory was now in full operation, and about to meet
its most difficult task, that of enforcing the laws it had passed,
as there were now three factions to contend with; those in
favor of the illegal government of the Territory of Jefferson,
those contending that this Territory was still Arapahoe County, Territory of Kansas, and those claiming that this was tribal
territory, so that neither government could function, and who
preferred to function by the miners' courts and through mass
meetings of the people. The prbvisional government had
extreme difficulty in obtaining funds for its treasury, taxes
amounting to voluntary contributions rather than a lien on
property; also public confidence was waning in the organization, as congress paid no attention to the appeals for the recognition of the territory formed, nor did it take notice of the
laws adopted and thus recognize it. Further, the authority
and the jurisdiction of Kansas was accepted by the great majority of the people when the more direct of their affairs were
involved.
Although most of the men interested in the pioneer town
companies had participated in the convention adopting a provisional government, such companies never recognized it, and
all business transactions were kept within Arapahoe County
and Kansas Territory, as shown by their records, town lot certificates, and deeds to real property. It appears that in no instance of any written transaction, did "Jefferson Territory"
figure in the papers of the case, as the place of the action.
However, Governor Steele issued a proclamation for the
second election for Territorial officers and members of the
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general assembly. This election was held October 22, 1860.
Governor Steele was again elected Governor, and although
some of the districts did not elect delegates to the assembly,
enough were elected to form an assembly.
In the meantime, the citizens of Denver resolved that the
city should secede from Jefferson Territory and establish a
provisional government for itself. On September 22, 1860,
a mass meeting of citizens was held, which approved a constitution entitled the "People's Government of the City of
Denver," and set the first day of October for the day to submit this question to a vote of the people, and elect its officers.
At.this election, the new government went into effect, almost
by unanimous vote, and Denver City passed from under the
jurisdiction of Jefferson Territory.
In, the meantime, various inhabitants of the Clear Creek
mining towns, moved by the example of Denver City, elected
delegates to a convention which was to provide for extinguishing Jefferson Territory and establishing a new form of government in its stead. These delegates met at Central City on
October 24, before the result of the Jefferson Territory general election had been determined, and after having been in
session two or three days adopted "An Act for a Judiciary
System" and called their organization Idaho Territory, and
elected a delegate to Congress to supersede Beverly D.
Williams, the delegate from Jefferson Territory.
However, the Jefferson Territory second general assembly met in Denver on November 12, and Governor Steele
delivered his message; but the business of the assembly was
second in the minds of the delegates due to the excitement
over the result of the presidential election, and the startling
news of secession from the Union by the states of the South.
It adjourned November 27, to Golden City, the principal
reason for the change of base being that Golden City offered
board at $6.00 per week, and wood, lights, and hall rent free.
As these lawmakers were serving without pay, the Golden
City inducements were persuasive. The members, however,
were indifferent, and took but little interest in the proceedings.
This assembly made a heroic effort to win attention by a
proposition to convert the Territory into the "State of Jefferson." This act was approved by the Governor on Decem-
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ber 12, and provided for holding a convention of delegates
to prepare a state constitution for Jefferson, but the proposition was not favorably received, and came to nothing. Governor Steele and his associate executives nominally held on
until the Territory of Colorado came into existence, and
started to function, upon the arrival of Governor Gilpin, who
had been appointed by the President as Governor of the
Territory of Colorado.
The "swan song" of Jefferson Territory was sung by
Governor Steele in his proclamation of evacuation June 6,
1861, as follows:
"PROCLAMATION"
"By virtue of the authority in me vested, I, R. W. Steele, Governor
of the Territory of Jefferson under the Provisional Government, and in and
by virtue of my election by a majority of the People of the then called government of the People of the Mining region, unrecognized by the General Government, at the base of the Rocky Mountains, on the East, and at the center
thereof, and placing our confidence in that 'over-ruling Providence' that has
for a long period of time, steadied us as an American people, through so many
difficulties by foes seen and unseen, I therefore issue this my proclamation in
view of the arrival of Governor Wm. Gilpin, and other officers of the United
States, whom I recognize as being duly in authority. I deem it but obligatory
upon me, by virtue of my office, to yield unto 'Caesar the things that are
Caesar's', and I hereby command and direct that all officers holding commissions under me, especially all Judges, Justices of the Peace, etc., shall surrender
the same and from this date shall abstain from exercising the duties of all
offices they may have held under me by virtue of said commissions, and further
I advise and recommend to all law and order loving citizens to submit to the
laws of the United States and restrain themselves from deeds of violence which
so long have made our peculiar position almost a bye word in the eyes of the
civilized world. Again I advise my fellow citizens who know me 'so long
and so well,' to yield obedience to the Laws of the United States, and do it
by attending to your proper and legitimate avocations, whether Agricultural
or Mining."
"R. W. STEELE, Governor."

And thus in closing we are reminded of that famous
painting by Emanuel Leutze in the House wing of the Nation Capitol, "Westward the Course of Empire Takes its
Way."

TAXING INCOME FROM THE EXCHANGE
OF PROPERTY

JUST

By George T. Evans of the Denver Bar

at this time the attention of many people is focused
upon the Constitution because of the recent decision by
Judge William Clark of the Federal District Court of
New Jersey that the Eighteenth Amendment not having been
ratified in, a convention called for that purpose is therefore
invalid. If nothing more may be said for the decision, it
doubtless does have merit in these days of "trick" legislative
enactments in that it has brought the people of the United
States face to face with the fact that there is still a fundamental
law of the land. Nobody will deny that the Eighteenth
Amendment furnishes an interesting topic for discussion, if
for no other reason than because it affects us in our drinking
or non-drinking. But there is another Amendment which
touches us almost as intimately, which has now passed more
or less beyond the realm of popular discussion-an Amendment which hits us in our pocketbooks rather than in our
stomachs. I mean the Sixteenth or Income Tax Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
The Sixteenth Amendment, which is certainly not encumbered with surplus verbiage, was adopted almost eighteen
years ago, eight Income Tax Acts have been passed by Congress under its authority, many phases of it have been tested
in the courts, but can we yet say that either the courts, the
people or Congress know definitely everything that it means?
Of one thing it seems we may be sure and that is that the question, of what is income can never be settled conclusively by
legislative fiat. Has Congress ever attempted to do just that?
Before we answer that question let us look at' Sections
111, 112 and 113 of the Revenue Act of 1928-the present
law. These sections provide for the determination and recognition of gain or loss from the sale, exchange or other disposition of property. By specific exception the exchange of
real estate held for productive use in trade or business or for
investment and not primarily for sale solely for other real
estate to be so held is not a gain or loss transaction. Exchanges
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of personal property under the same circumstances are also
taken out of the category of transactions from which gain or
loss may arise. But, by an exception to the exception, the
exchange of stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates
of trust or beneficial interest and other securities or evidences
of indebtedness are, according to the Revenue Act of 1928,
gain or loss transactions. In other words, the exchange of a
share of common stock which cost less than the fair market
value on the date of the exchange of another share of common
stock in a different corporation for which it was exchanged
results in gain that is recognized as taxable under Sections
111, 112 and 113 of the Revenue Act of 1928. In enacting
these sections has Congress in effect defined "income"? If
so, is the definition within the meaning of the term "incomes"
in the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution? Or has
Congress gone outside the meaning of the word "incomes" in
the Sixteenth Amendment and thus exceeded its power thereunder?
Before we can find an answer to these inquiries it will
be necessary to turn back the whirligig of time to the year
1895, for in that year the Supreme Court by its decision in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U. S.601,
not only demolished the then existing system of income taxation in the United States but forever banished the possibility
of erecting another until the Constitution was changed. Speaking of the Act of August 15, 1894, the court said:
"First: We adhere to the opinion already announced that, taxes on
real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real
estate are equally direct taxes.
"Second. We are of the opinion that taxes on personal property, or
on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes.
"Third. The tax imposed by . . . .the Act of 1894, so far as it falls
on the income of real estate and of personal property, being a direct-tax within
the meaning of the Constitution, is . . . . unconstitutional and void because
not apportioned . ..."

Obviously this decision did not attempt to define "income" but it is an important decision in our present inquiry
because of the background it furnishes for the Sixteenth
Amendment. Its effect was to make the source from which
income arose the criterion of whether or not a tax on that
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income was or was not a direct tax. In other words, after
the Pollock decision, income from property could not be taxed
unless that tax were apportioned, as required by Article 1,
Section 2, Clause 3, and Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4 of the
original Constitution.
The impracticability of apportioning an income tax was
realized, and during the years between 1895 and 1913 the
Sixteenth Amendment was advocated, proposed and finally
submitted to the States in the following words:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes
from whatever source derived without regard to apportionment among the
several states and without regard to any census or enumeration."

On February 25, 1913, the Amendment was proclaimed
adopted.
It will be noted that "income" is not defined in the
Amendment. The only purpose of the Amendment was to
eliminate the source of income from consideration in determining the constitutionality of a tax laid thereon. As was
said on this point by Mr. Chief Justice White in Brushaber
v. The Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1:
"....

there is no escape from the conclusion that the Amendment was drawn

for the purpose of doing away for the future with the principle upon which
the Pollock case was decided . ..

."

The reason for the Sixteenth Amendment is thus apparent. It was not intended to, nor did it, define "income"
but the term "incomes" is used therein. May Congress by
legislation alter the import of "incomes" to suit the variable
concept of "income" in the minds of the changing majority
of its members, or does "incomes" have a fixed meaning with
which Congress is not permitted to tamper? Let us see what
the Supreme Court has said on the subject.
"..... There would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given

the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given
to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and what that meaning is has now
become definitely settled by decisions of this court." (Merchants' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509)

Again we must glance into history. What meaning has
been given to the word "incomes" by the Supreme Court as
that word was used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of
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1909? We turn to Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231
U. S. 399, a case arising under the Act of 1909 and one of the
really famous cases in income taxation; a case wherein the
defendant was the present Collector of Internal Revenue for
Colorado, and counsel for the plaintiff was then and is still
one of the leaders of the Colorado Bar. There, Mr. Justice
Pitney, speaking for the Supreme Court, said:
". ...
Income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined . .. ."

In connection with this definition of "income" it must be
remembered that the Act under examination laid a tax on
doing business in the corporate form and that one of the points
made by the plaintiff was that the mining of gold did not
constitute doing business within the meaning of the Act. But,
said the court of the activities of the corporation, ".

.

. it is

employing capital and labor in transmuting part of the royalty
into personalty." This, as the court viewed the matter, was a
process akin to manufacturing giving rise to income, as above
defined, from doing business.
Here, then, is the first authoritative definition of "income"
in a taxing Act operating before the Sixteenth Amendment
was adopted. Does it throw any light upon what constitutes
income from the disposition of property through a transaction
which is not a sale under an Income Tax Act effective after
the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment? Thus far it probably does not. The decision in effect was that where the inherent characteristics or inherent nature of property was,
through a process similar to manufacturing, transmuted from
personalty into realty, that process was doing business and
hence income arising from the process was a proper measure
of the tax laid by the Act of 1909.
Let us proceed, however, to examine another case arising
under the same Act where there was a conversion of real
property into cash but where that conversion was not the result
of any process.
The leading case on this phase of the question is Doyle v.
Mitchell Brothers Company, 247 U. S. 183, decided in 1917.
One of the questions in that case was whether or not income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment was derived

DICTA

from the actual sale of a capital asset (timberland) for cash.
The court held that the gain from such a transaction was income according to the Sixteenth Amendment and this although there was no process of conversion involved. The
court said:
" ....
Selling for profit is too familiar a business transaction to permit us
to suppose that it was intended to be omitted from consideration in an act
for taxing doing business in corporate form upon the basis of the income received "from all sources"."

So much for the meaning of the word "income" in the
Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909. It probably may safely
be said that so far as any income arising from the disposition
of property was concerned where there was no sale, in the
light of these decisions there must have been a conversion of
that property before taxable income could have been received
but a process of conversion was not essential.
"When we come to apply the Acts to gains acquired through an increase in the value of capital assets .

question of difficulty appear .

...

.

.

and converted into money ....

" (Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.)

Was any change in this view brought about by the Sixteenth Amendment? We shall see.
The first case arising after the Sixteenth Amendment in
which the Supreme Court felt called upon to define "income"
was the famous "stock-dividend case" of Eisner v. Macomber,
272 U. S. 189, in which the present Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court was successful as counsel in
having that part of the Revenue Act of 1916 which laid a tax
upon stock-dividends declared unconstitutional. In this case
Mr. Justice Pitney, who had written the definition for the
court in the Howbert case, and applied it in the Doyle case,
speaking of the definition said:
"After examining dictionaries in common use ....
we find little to add
to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation
Tax Act of August 5, 1909 . ...
'Income may be defined as the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood
to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which
it was applied in the Doyle Case."

Thus, where there has been a sale of a capital asset
(property) the idea that there must have been a conversion of
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the property seems to permeate these definitions. What is
the meaning of "conversion"? At law, of course, it means
the unlawful exercise of dominion over the chattels of another. Obviously it was not used in that class. In equity it
means that fictitious change in the inherent nature of property
adopted by courts in order that substantial justice may be done.
Conversion was not used strictly in that sense in the definitionabove, because the conversion which took place in the case
above adverted to was not fictitious but actual. But the equitable meaning may, however, have tinged the meaning involved.
To define "conversion" in its ordinary sense we must look
for its ordinary meaning in dictionaries in common use. In
Webster's International Dictionary we find:
"Conversion:
(1)
The act of turning or changing from one state or
condition to another, or the state of being changed; transmutation, change.
The artificial conversion of water into ice-Bacon.
The conversion of aliment into fat-Arbuthnot."

We turn to the definition of "transmute" and find that
it is:
"To change from one nature, form, or substance into another; to transform."

We look up the word "transform" and find that it means:
"(1)
To change the form of; to change in shape or appearance; to
metamorphose; as, a caterpillar is ultimately transformed into a butterfly."

The illustrative example of the use of the word is:
"Love may transform me to an oyster"-Shakesphere.

All of these definitions are from Webster's International
Dictionary.
And in the New Standard Dictionary "conversion" is
defined as follows:
"Conversion: (1) The act of converting or of being converted; change from
one state or position to another, or from one form to another; as the conversion of iron into steel; exchange of one object or thing for another, as the conversion of timberland to arable land, of stocks into money, or food into blood,
Syn: change, regeneration, renewal, transformation, transmutation."

Thus, from all the words that might have been used by
the Supreme Court to indicate for the guidance of all the
people, economists, financiers, accountants, farmers, lawyers,
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businessmen, and for that great mass of individuals in the
United States who come within none of these classifications,
what sort of a disposition of capital assets (property) resulted
in taxable income from a transaction which was not a sale,
the court selected the word "conversion". Surely no one is
entitled to presume that the word was chosen thoughtlessly,
nor used inaptly, nor in any but its ordinary meaning in the
sense of its most common acceptation by that body of people
of all kinds and varying degrees of education to whom it must
be understood to have been addressed. Apparently, conversion in its most common acceptation always denotes a change
in inherent character, and, if it is not desired to indicate such
a change, then conversion is not the word to be used. The
charge of selecting the wrong word to thus express its meaning could hardly be made against the court which used it in
the definition of "income".
Let us now look at the background of Eisner v. Macomber for further light on the word "conversion" as used
in. that decision. We turn to Stratton's Independence v. Howbert. In that case in the words of the court one of the points
at issue was "that the proceeds of mining operations result
from a conversion of the capital represented by real estate
into capital represented by cash . . ." The decision in the
particular case of Stratton's Independence v. Howbert was
that income for the purpose of measuring the excise tax on
corporations laid by the Act of August 5, 1909, upon the privilege of doing business in the corporate form was derived from
the business of converting the capital asset real estate into cash
through the process of mining ". . . equivalent in its results
to a manufacturing process". The conclusion to be drawn
from this use of the word "conversion" and the explanatory
statements in the decision might be that the court had in mind
when it used the word a change in the very nature, in the
essential characteristic, of property, a change brought about
by a process so that as a result of the process what was real
property before would be personal property afterwards-a
transmutation of the inherent nature of property by a process
in this case similar to manufacture and similar to the changes
which take place in the examples illustrating the word "conversion" in Webster's International Dictionary.
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"..... It is employing capital and labor in transmuting a part of the realty into
personalty". (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert)

And so, the question of whether the mere conversion of
the capital asset real estate into cash in an isolated transaction
not connected with a tax on corporations making a business
of such conversion through a process, was income, was not
covered by the decision in the Howbert case. An inference
might perhaps be drawn that such a conversion did not give
rise to income.
Then came the decision in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers
Company. One question there was whether or not income for
the purpose of measuring the excise tax laid by the Act of
August 5, 1909, on doing business in corporate form, was
derived from the sale of a capital asset in an isolated transaction not taking place in the regular and ordinary course of
its business. The court held that a gain or profit from such a
conversion was properly considered income for the purpose
of measuring the excise tax, and said in part:
"When we come to apply the act to gains acquired through an increase
in the value of capital assets . . . . and converted into money . . . . questions
of difficulty appear ....
Selling for profit is too familiar a business transaction
to permit us to suppose that it was intended to be omitted from consideration
in an act for taxing doing business in corporate form upon the basis of the
income received 'from all sources'."

Here the word "converted" is used but the case did not
involve any process of conversion. The capital asset, real
property, was by sale actually converted into cash (personal
property) in an isolated transaction. Thus there was a conversion of property of one inherent nature into a property
of a different inherent nature. It is conceivable that the word
"converted" as used in the Doyle decision was used in the same
sense as the word "conversion" in the Howbert decision to
denote this transmutation of inherent nature, this change in
essential characteristics of the property involved, and that the
only difference between the two decisions so far as the words
are concerned is that in the former case there was a process
of conversion and in the latter there was not. The fact that
in both cases what was real property before the conversion
was personal property afterwards is obvious.
After these two decisions involving the Excise Tax Act
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of 1909, which operated before the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, there came in 1920 the decision in Eisner v.
Macomber. This involved the Revenue Act of 1916, which
was, of course, effective after the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment. In that case the court adverted with approval
to its definition of "income" in the Howbert case, the application thereof in the Doyle case, and added to the definition
the following words:
". ...

provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or

conversion of capital assets."

For what reason were these words added? Conceivably
it could have been to harmonize the definition in the Macomber case with the decision in the Howbert case and in the
Doyle case and make the definition consistent with the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. From all of this
would it not seem logical to conclude that the word "conversion" was used in the definition in Eisner v. Macomber
in its ordinary sense, perhaps suggested by its meaning in
equity, but, in any event, to denote an actual conversion such
as takes place when there is an artificial change of water into
ice (Bacon), or where there is a transmutation of aliment
into fat (Arbuthnot), or where a caterpillar is ultimately
transformed into a butterfly (Webster's International Dictionary) ?
And so the rationale of the change in the definition of
"income" as it was in the Howbert case to what it ultimately
became in the Macomber case is perhaps proof that the word
"conversion" was not used by the Supreme Court in any sense
as equivalent of exchange but was used in its ordinary meaning to denote a change and transmutation, not an exchange of
like for like. Certainly if the examples in Webster's International Dictionary cited to illustrate the meaning of the
word "conversion", the changing of water into ice, the changing of aliment into fat, the changing of a caterpillar into a
butterfly, and the transforming of a a man into an oyster, are
examples of what the word "conversion" means, then the mere
trade of a share of common stock (personal property) for one
share of common stock (personal property) would seem to
be a long way from a conversion.
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There cannot be much dispute that such a conversion of
property as is illustrated by the examples from the dictionary
where there is a change in inherent nature does give rise to
taxable income if made at an advantage. In that case property of one kind of a certain nature with certain characteristics
inherent therein, would be parted with, and property of a
different kind, of a different nature, with different inherent
qualities, would be acquired therefor. But any transaction
which does not have these results is perhaps an exchange and
not a change, a trade and not a transmutation, and therefore
not a conversion giving rise to income within the meaning of
the term "incomes" in the Sixteenth Amendment.
Passing over the point that if the tax in effect laid by
Sections 111, 112 and 113 is a direct tax on the unrealized
growth or increase in the value of property it might also be
a direct tax on the property itself, and unconstitutional unless
apportioned, it would, it seems, be extraordinary indeed not
only to permit Congress to disregard the Supreme Court's
definitions of "income" in cases involving Income Tax Laws
operating both before and after the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment, but also to allow that body by legislation to put
into a man's pocket the unrealized increase in the value of
his property at a given date by conjuring out of the uncertainty that he will ever be able to reduce that increase to his
actual possession, the definite present fact that he has already
got it. That conceivably would be to permit the Legislature
to extend a constitutional provision.
We started out to determine whether or not Congress has
attempted to settle by legislature fiat the question of what is
income from the exchange or other disposition of property.
We wanted to discover whether or not in enacting Sections
111, 112 and 113, of the Revenue Act-of 1928, Congress had
in effect defined "income" and, if so, whether or not that definition was within the meaning of the term "incomes" in the
Sixteenth Amendment, or whether it was outside that meaning. We have used up all available data from Which we might
draw conclusions, but we have failed in our undertaking. We
must have more information from the Supreme Court before
we can pursue our inquiry further.

DICTAPHUN
Five years and more now gone, Henry Wolcott Toll, ex, former, quondam and late state senator, started a magazine-yes he did-which was first
described as Unchristened Notes of The Colorado Bar Association. The
second number and the seven succeeding (there were no more--doxology)
were called The Jealous Mistress. This name was the brain child of the
following distinguished group, some of whom are now in office, that is to say:
W. W. Grant, Jr., penologist, Harrie M. Humphreys, counselor at law,
Edward Ring, raconteur, Richard H. Hart, grievances, Julian H. Moore,
wotajudge, Donald C. McCreery, local lawyer without a Washington partner, Hamlet J. Barry, Republican committeeman, Ben Hilliard, former
lawyer, and Robert W. Steele, the juvenile district judge. Anyway, Richard
(Big Dick) Peete thought of the name and the committee appropriated it.
The result of the choice of that name, leaving aside the demise of the
magazine, was to stir up great minds both here and abroad to ascertain who
first said that the law is a jealous mistress. The erudite Mr. Toll could not
say, Dean Pound was at a loss, the American Bar Association could not
answer. In fact, the name of the author could not be discovered.
By a singular coincidence the name of the author of the word
"Dictaphun" is also a mystery. And if he is a wise man he will keep his
identity concealed. The only proper place for the use of that vile expression
is in a contest soon to be inaugurated for the worst pun of 1931. Prize:
The same one offered for a name for this department in Dicta for December,
viz., huge.

TWO (2)-BIG CONTESTS-(2) TWO
Know ye, that by authority of the Editors, two (2) contests have been
officially decreed. What the lucky winners will receive is to be determined
by the Prize Group of the Denver Bar Association. Predictions are being
freely made that the original of the manuscript from which this is to be printed
will be given as one of the awards. It will not be autographed.

CONTEST NO. ONE!

The Split Infinitive Sweepstakes.
Who may participate: Judges of the Supreme Court.
Winner will be: The judge who uses the most split infinitives in
Volumes 88 and 89, Colorado Reports.
Rules: Employment of professional infinitive splitters barred. Split
infinitives used in per curiam opinions will be divided into seven parts and
equitably distributed among the contestants. Infinitives split by one word,
one point; by two words, three points; by three or more words, five points;
by a prepositional phrase, twenty-five points. Split infinitives used in quotations from Colorado statutes, no credit; those used in quotations from other
courts (Arkansas excepted), one-fourth point; Arkansas splits, one-half point
off each.
Prize: To be announced as aforesaid. But well worth striving for.
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CONTEST NO. TWO! !
Dissenting Opinion Handicap.
Who may participate: Judges of the Supreme Court (Republican).
Who may not participate: Judge of the Supreme Court (Democratic).
Winner will be: The judge who writes the most dissenting opinions in
1931.
Rules:
Prize:

They'll be needed.
Rhyming dictionary, 1927 Edition.

LEGISLATIVE BUREAU
To the members of the bar who have been in the Colorado legislature
and to the members of the bar who will sit in that body during its 28th
regular session the Editors respectfully dedicate (and endorse) the statement
of Chief Justice Hayt in Catron v. The Board of County Commissioners of
Archuleta County, 18 Colo. 553, 558:
"
"... Legislators, frequently, and sometimes good lawyers ...

POETRY SECTION
Those who think our claim that there is no meter in Grant, Ellis,
Shafroth and Toll' was unfounded are left to judge for themselves if the lines
below fall within the classification of aeolian. These lines were submitted
by a nameless (so far as we know) individual.
You say that you struggled with partnership names
To put into readable verse;
Not even Lee Casey could put them in rhymes
In a meter that's fit to rehearse.
You surely are wrong; your medullas are thick;
Right feetly the syllables roll;
Pershing, Nye, Tallmadge, Bosworth and Dick
And Grant, Ellis, Shafroth and Toll.'
Take it or leave; we leave it.

NOTE OF GRATITUDE SECTION
The Editors desire to express their thanks to those who were good
enough to suggest material for this department. The material submitted is
in the hands of the censors and will reach print if three things survive, to wit,
from left to right: (1) The Editors, (2) Dictaphun, and (3) Dicta.
The Editors desire also to hope that others will favor us with suggestions
and material. Criticism will be tolerated as well as unheeded.
1. Advertising Department of Dicta, 828 Symes Bldg., Denver. The advertising manager has just
notified the Editors that Grant, Ellis, Shafroth and Toll must positively pay Dicta the same rate they pay
the classified section of the telephone directory or no more mention of Grant, Ellis, Shafroth and Toll.

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS RECEIVED AT
SUPREME COURT LIBRARY
U. S. Supreme Court Reports Digest. 10 volumes. 1930. Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester, N. Y. This is certainly the most useful and comprehensive
digest of the U. S. Supreme Court Reports ever published. Each of the ten volumes
is kept up to date by a cumulative pocket supplement. Remarkable features of the
Digest are: The new U. S. Code, Annotated, citations are given to Acts of Congress cited in the digest; cross references to corresponding sections in A. L. R.
and L. R. A. digests and parallel reference tables; a table of all statutes, resolutions, treaties and proclamations construed or cited; tables of statutes cited by
popular names; cross reference and descriptive word index; a complete table of
cases digested. Rules of Court are included and copied in the following order:
General Rules of U. S. Supreme Court; Equity Rules of Practice; Admiralty Rules
of Practice; Rules of the Court of Claims and Rules of the Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Interstate Commerce Act Annotated. 5 volumes. 1930. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C. This work was prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission and is "a comprehensive compilation and annotation of the Federal Laws
relating to the regulation of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act."
The Supreme Court Library contains also the complete I. C. C. Reports and
digests.
BOOKS RECEIVED
Progress of the Law in the U. S. Supreme Court. 1930. By Gregory Hankin and
Charlotte A. Hankin. Legal Research Service. Washington.
Judicial Review of Federal Executive Action.
Michie Company. Charlottesville, Va.

1930.

By Patrick H. Loughran.

The

May It Please The Court. By James M. Beck. 1930. Edited by 0. R. McGuire of
the Virginia bar. The Harrison Co. Atlanta, Ga.
Holdsworth History of the English Law. 9 volumes.
K. C., D. C. L., Little Brown & Co. Boston.

1926.

By W. S. Holdsworth,

Commercial Arbitration, Practice & Procedure. By Wesley A. Sturges, Professor of
Law, Yale University. 1930. Vernon Law Book Co., Kansas City, Mo.
Damage Verdicts, 2 vols. By George H. Parmele.
Co., Rochester, N. Y.

Lawyers Co-operative Publishing

Corporate Foreclosures, Receivorships and Reorganization.
Tracy. Callaghan & Co. Chicago.

1929.

By John

Evarts

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
DISTRICT COURT, DENVER-No. 110233-Mary Shivall v.
The Prudential Insurance Company of America. E. V.
Holland, Judge. Decided November 25, 1930.
Facts.-Action for reformation of and judgment on an
insurance policy issued by defendant. The policy was dated
March 21, 1929, and subsequent premiums were due on or
before each March 21st. The policy was delivered and the
first premium paid April 20, 1929. The insured died on June
4, 1930, without having paid the second premium.
The policy provided that if the policy was in force one
full year from its date and lapsed for nonpayment of premiums, the company would continue the insurance for sixty
days from the due date of the premium; the policy also provided that the application be made a part of the contract.
Defendant having demurred, plaintiff contended that according to the application the true date of the policy should
be the date of delivery and payment of the premium.
Held.-The application controls the date of the policy
only when the application is accompanied by the first premium, and is approved by the company. Here the company
could date the policy as of the day of its final approval of the
application, but the contract so dated became binding on the
company only on its delivery, and payment of the first premium. The contract being unambiguous, and there being no
fraud or mistake in the making of the contract, plaintiff has
no grounds for relief.
Ordered.-Demurrersustained.
110 2 0 8 -In re Estate of
Emitt Bryant Jones. E. V. Holland, Judge. Decided November 24, 1930.
Facts.-Testator during his lifetime took out a war risk
insurance policy and named his mother as beneficiary. Testator died in 1925, and his will was admitted to probate. One
provision of the will provided: "I give, devise and bequeath
to my mother, Rachael Caroline Jones, my United States
DISTRICT COURT, DENVER-No.
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Government war risk insurance policy." The mother died in
1928. The government then paid the remaining balance of
the policy to the estate of the testator.
Held.-The mother acquired a vested right to the policy,
as legatee, under the clear and unambiguous terms of the will.
Therefore on her death the right to the unpaid balance went
to her heirs, and was not in the testator's estate.
Ordered.-That the fund be paid to the mother's heirs
as soon as same are determined.

DISTRICT

COURT,

DENVER-No.

109941-Metro-Goldwyn-

Moyerdist, Corp. v. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.-Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge. Decided December 15, 1930.
Facts.-Contract provided that all disputes should be
submitted to a board of arbitration before either party should
resort to any Court. Defendant demurred on ground that
plaintiff had not submitted the dispute to the board of arbitration. Defendant also moved to strike as irrelevant that
part of the complaint which set out that plaintiff had been
enjoined by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York from enforcing directly or indirectly
the arbitration provisions of the contract because that provision as used by plaintiff constituted a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and that plaintiff had offered to submit
this cause to arbitration under the contract or in any other
way, provided the same could be done without violating that
injunction.
Held.-While the Supreme Court has held in Ezell v.
Rocky Mountain Co., 76 Colo. 409, 413, that where a party
contracts to submit certain questions to arbitration, he is bound
by the contract, the Supreme Court must have meant that arbitration must be pursued unless recourse to that mode of adjustment has been rendered impossible by conditions beyond
control of the party suing. Here, plaintiff's offer to arbitrate
in any way which would not violate the injunction of the
United States District Court was therefore sufficient to take
it out of the ruling of Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Co. Demurrer and motion overruled.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIToR's No'rE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

TRIAL-FINDINGS OF FACT-No DISTURBANCE OF ON APPEAL

-No. 12475-Kniffen vs. Gavin, Administrator-Decided
November 24, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff seeks to enforce the payment of
three promissory notes against the estate of Timothy Foley,
deceased. The court held, upon conflicting evidence, that the
notes were forgeries and disallowed the plaintiff's claim.
Error was alleged.
Held.-There was sufficient evidence upon which to support the finding of the lower court, and it will not be disturbed here.
Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS OF FACT-NO DISTURBANCE OF-NO. 12663-Industrial Commission et al

vs. Diveley-Decided November 24, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff's husband died as the result of a
ruptured appendix. The question as to whether or not the
rupture was caused by an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment was disputed. Upon hearing before
the referee, compensation was denied. The referee's findings
were affirmed by the commission. The claimant thereupon
brought an action in the district court, and that court gave
a judgment setting aside the award of the commission and
making an award in favor of the claimant.
Held.-The burden is upon the claimant to prove that
the accident arose out of and in the course of employment;
and the claimant also has the further burden of proving that
the injuries for which compensation is claimed were the proximate result of the accident. Upon the question of causal connection, the evidence was conflicting and the award of the
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commission, based upon conflicting testimony, can not be disturbed.
Judgment reversed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PLATS-EFFECT OF-VACATION

DEEDS-NO. 12331--Brell vs. Town of Ovid-Decided
December 1, 1930.
Facts.-Brell was the owner of certain property which
was shown on a plat for the Town of Ovid. Brell filed a deed
vacating the avenues, streets and alleys adjacent to the blocks
owned by him within the limits of the Town. Subsequently,
the Town of Ovid was incorporated. Thereafter Brell
brought suit to disconnect from the incorporated town all of
the land owned by him within the town limits, but inasmuch
as he did not have the required twenty acres, judgment went
against him.
Brell thereupon filed a second vacation deed which attempted to cover the streets, alleys and avenues which had
already been covered by the prior deed; and to also include
other streets and alleys not in the prior deed. Brell then filed
the present suit. The trial court gave Brell title to all the
land covered by the first deed and quieted in the Town of
Ovid the land omitted from the first vacation deed. Brell
complains of the decree.
Held.-(1) After filing his first vacation deed, Brell did
not own the four adjacent blocks as required by the statute as
a condition to the vacation of avenues, streets and alleys. The
second vacation deed was, therefore, void.
(2) The contention of the plaintiff that there was no
need of a vacation deed in that there had never been a dedication of the streets and alleys in question is unsound in that
the statute provides that upon the incorporation of a city or
town all avenues etc. described on the plat as being for public
use shall be deemed public property and the fee thereof shall
be vested in such city or town.
Judgment affirmed.
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FRATERNAL INSURANCE-RATES-AMENDMENTS TO CONSTI-

12544-Woodmen of the World, et al. vs.
McCue, et al.-Decided December 15, 1930.
Facts.-Suit was filed in lower court by eight members
of the fraternal benefit society to enjoin it from enforcing certain of its laws which operated to increase its rates and method
of insurance and injunction was granted. Questions raised
were did plaintiffs have capacity to sue and were the amendments objected to legally adopted.
Held.-Plaintiffs had capacity to sue. Sec. 2624 and
2625 C. L. of 1921, providing for attorney general to make
application for injunction not applicable because this only
refers to winding up of insurance society and in this case no
such relief is sought.
Amendments increasing rates were not legally adopted in
that the constitution of the society provided that amendments
to the constitution must be adopted by two-thirds of the votes
of any regular or special Head Camp Session and such amendments were not adopted by such two-thirds vote.
Judgment affirmed.
TUTION-No.

12S91-People vs. AllenDecided December 22, 1930.
Facts.-Respondent Allen helped organize the American
Tax Company, was a director thereof and before his election
to the board was employed as general attorney and was voted
10,000 shares of its stock for the first year of his services, including organization work. The stock was not actually issued
and delivered and Allen was paid $10,000 in cash and his
stock was then issued and turned back for application to a
personal account, representing funds that Allen had drawn
from the treasury of the company. This was done on the sole
authority of the president and with the consent of the secretarytreasurer. The company paid dividends when it had no net
earnings. Allen participated in declaring such dividends.
Held.-Allen's withdrawal of $10,000 of the company's
funds and his discharge of that indebtedness by a credit on
the books for the return of his 10,000 shares of stock, was by
ATTORNEYS-DISBARMENT-NO.
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collusion with the president and was a fraud on the company.
The illegal payment of dividends was with the advice and
consent of Allen and for the purpose of defrauding the public
by the promotion of sales of stock.
Name of respondent stricken from roll of attorneys of
this state and he is forbidden to appear as such in any of its
courts.
PLEADING-No. 12256-Molholm v. Broomfield State Bank
-Decided December 1, 1930.
Facts.-The bank sued Mrs. Molholm on two promissory
notes. The defendant sought to avoid liability on the ground
that the notes were signed without consideration and as an
accommodation to the bank. For reasons which do not appear, the trial court did not permit this to be pleaded and
judgment was rendered against the defendant.
Held.-This was a good defense and should not have
been stricken from the record.
Judgment reversed.
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